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OPENING THE DOOR TO SINGLE GOVERNMENT: THE 2002 
MARYLAND REDISTRICTING DECISION GIVES THE COURTS 
TOO MUCH POWER IN AN HISTORICALLY POLITICAL ARENA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I speak tonight for the dignity of man and the destiny of democracy 
. . . . But even if we pass this bill, the battle will not be over. What 
happened in Selma is part of a far larger movement which reaches 
into every section and State of America. It is the effort of American 
Negroes to secure for themselves the full blessings of American life. 
Their cause must be our cause too, because it is not just Negroes but 
really it is all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry 
and injustice. And we shall overcome.} 
-Lyndon B. Johnson 
Since President Lyndon B. Johnson introduced the original Voting 
Rights Act ("VRA") to protect minority voting rights in 1965,2 the re-
quirements of the VRA have continuously conflicted with the require-
ments set forth in the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution and other state constitutional requirements for redistrict-
ing. 3 For example, the VRA is often incompatible with the Maryland 
constitutional redistricting requirements of compactness, contiguity, 
and due regard for natural boundaries.4 
1. President Lyndon B.Johnson, Voting Rights Address to Congress (Mar. 15, 
1965). See also GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION 
TO THE PRESENT DAY, 1864-1981, 459-61 (Richard Hofstadter & Beatrice 
Hofstadter eds., 1982). President Johnson refers to "Bloody Sunday" in 
Selma, Alabama. We Shall Overcome: Historic Places of the Civil Rights Move-
ment. Selma to Montgomery March, available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/NR/ 
travel.civilrights/aI4.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003). On Sunday, March 7, 
1965, six hundred civil rights marchers set out to Montgomery for the 
Selma-ta-Montgomery march for voting rights. Id. They had traveled only 
six blocks to a local bridge, however, when state and local lawmen attacked 
them with billy-clubs and tear gas. [d. Two days later Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. led a symbolic march to the Selma local bridge. [d. 
2. Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1506, 1520 
(2002). 
3. David Guinn et aI., Redistricting in 2001 and Beyond: Navigating the Narrow 
Channel Between the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act, 51 BAYLOR 
L. REv. 225, 266-67 (1999); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a 
discussion of the VRA, see infra Part II.B. 
4. Guinn, supra note 3, at 266-67; MD. CONST. art. III, § 4 (2002) ("[e]ach 
legislative district shall consist of adjoining territory, be compact in form, 
and of substantially equal population ... regard shall be given to natural 
boundaries and the boundaries of political subdivision"). 
123 
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Because of these competing requirements, redistricting often in-
volves the drawing of a redistricting map with plans for ensuing litiga-
tion, resulting in the map being struck down and returned to the 
legislature for re-drafting. 5 Present day redistricting problems are typ-
ically resolved through litigation, rather than through legislation.6 
Judge Raker's dissent in the 2002 Court of Appeals of Maryland case, 
In re Legislative Districting of the State, reminds courts that the process of 
redistrictinlif remains an "inherently political and legislative-not judi-
cial-task." 
The 2002 Maryland redistricting plan, proposed by former Gover-
nor Glendening and the Maryland General Assembly, should not have 
been rejected by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The court failed 
to consider the VRA and treated county line cross-overs in the 
Glendening plan as per se violations of the Maryland Constitution.8 In-
stead of balancing the requirements of the Maryland Constitution 
against those mandated by federal law, such as the VRA and the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court of Appeals of Maryland statically applied 
Maryland constitutional law, leaving no room for the federal require-
ments.9 Furthermore, the court erred in its remedy when it drew its 
own redistricting plan without allowing the Governor and General As-
sembly to redesign the plan themselves.1O In doing this, the court of 
appeals delved into a typically political arena traditionally intended 
for the legislature.}} 
Part II of this comment will address the competing federal require-
ments of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. It also looks to how other 
states have recently interpreted these federal mandates in their dis-
tricting schemes. Part III outlines the Maryland constitutional re-
quirements, focusing on compactness, contiguity, and due regard for 
natural boundaries. Part IV provides an in-depth analysis of the pro-
posed 2002 Maryland districting plan, and proposes that the plan 
should have been upheld by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
II. THE CONFLICTING FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 
A. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person 
5. Guinn, supra note 3, at 227. 
6. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 370 Md. 312, 376, 805 A.2d 292, 329-30 
(2002) (Raker, j., dissenting). 
7. Id. (quoting Jensen v. Wisc. Elections Bd., 639 N.W.2d 537, 540 (2002)). 
8. See generally id. 
9. See id. at 380-81, 805 A.2d at 332. See infra Part III for a discussion of the 
Maryland constitutional requirements. 
10. See In re Legislative Dist. of State, 370 Md. at 374-75, 805 A.2d at 328-29. 
11. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "12 The central 
mandate of the clause "is [to maintain] racial neutrality in govern-
mental decisionmaking."13 
The United States recognized its first racial gerrymander14 claim in 
Shaw v. Reno ("Shaw I '') .15 In Shaw I, the Supreme Court held that the 
appellants had stated a racial gerrymander claim sufficient to defeat a 
motion to dismiss. 16 The Court, however, was careful to point out that 
not all race-conscious redistricting was unconstitutional. 17 
In Shaw I, the bizarre shapes of two North Carolina voting districts 
were a decisive factor in determining that appellants had stated a 
cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause alleging an uncon-
stitutional gerrymander. 18 The Court stated that the racial gerryman-
der claim was "analytically distinct" from a voter dilution claim. 19 The 
Court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether 
the North Carolina plan constituted an unconstitutional racial gerry-
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
13. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995). 
14. The term "gerrymander" refers to the practice of drawing legislative dis-
tricts to protect incumbents and possibly harm the prospects of other po-
tential candidates. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 609, 629 
A.2d 646,664 (1993). The Supreme Court has held that "avoiding contests 
between incumbents is a permissible reason for states to deviate from creat-
ing districts with perfectly equal populations." Id. at 610, 629 A.2d at 664 
(citing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983)). The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland has construed this to mean that "it is ... permissible for 
states to consider incumbents in crafting districts in the first place" and 
"incumbent residency is a factor which may legitimately be considered in 
redistricting negotiations and plans." Id. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The term "racial gerrymander" derives its roots from the history of 
gerrymandering decisions. It is distinct, however, because instead of trying 
to protect incumbents, districts are drawn to purposefully divide minority 
populations, preventing them from obtaining majority voting strength in 
all possible districts. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993) [hereinafter 
Shaw IJ. 
15. 509 U.S. 630. In Shaw I, a group of North Carolina voters challenged two 
districts claiming that their irregular shapes constituted an unconstitutional 
gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 633-34. 
16. Id. at 642, 649. 
17. [d. at 642; see also Guinn, supra note 3, at 228. The Court stated that "appel-
lants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always un-
constitutional. That concession is wise: "This Court has never held that 
race-conscious state decision making is impermissible in all circumstances." 
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642. 
18. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647-49, 658. 
19. Id. at 652; see also Guinn, supra note 3, at 232. 
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mander.20 It instructed the district court to make its determination 
applying a strict scrutiny review.21 
Two years later, the same Court decided Miller v. johnson,22 holding 
that a bizarre shape of a district is only "circumstantial evidence"23 of a 
racial gerrymander, and that "a plaintiff must demonstrate that a dis-
trict's shape is so bizarre that it is unexplainable other than on the 
basis of race .... "24 The Court emphasized that a plaintiff, in addi-
tion to introducing evidence of a district's shape and demographics, 
must also demonstrate that the legislature's purpose or motivation was 
race based.25 The Court announced that strict scrutiny is to be used 
where race is the "predominant factor" motivating the construction of 
district boundary lines.26 It held that the plaintiff, in a racial gerry-
20. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 658. 
[d. 
[W]e hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal 
Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General As-
sembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face 
that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into 
separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separa-
tion lacks sufficient justification. 
21. [d. The case eventually made it back to the Supreme Court, where they 
found the redistricting plan unconstitutional. Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, re-
manded sub nom. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'd, 517 
U.S. 899, 901-02 (1996). 
22. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
23. [d. at 912-13. The Court stated that circumstantial evidence is "persuasive," 
and that circumstantial evidence of a district's bizarre shape, together with 
demographics, may be enough to meet the plaintiff's burden in proving 
race was a predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to draw 
district lines as it did. [d. at 916. 
24. [d. at 910. 
25. [d. at 915-16. 
26. [d. at 915-20. In a concurring opinion,justice O'Connor defends the use of 
strict scrutiny, stating: 
I understand the threshold standard the Court adopts-that "the 
legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting princi-
pIes ... to racial considerations,"-to be a demanding one. To 
invoke strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must show that the State has relied 
on race in a substantial disregard of customary and traditional dis-
tricting practices. Those practices provide a crucial frame of refer-
ence and therefore constitute a significant governing principle in 
cases of this kind. The standard would be no different if a legisla-
ture had drawn the boundaries to favor some other ethnic group; 
certainly the standard does not treat efforts to create majority-mi-
nority districts less favorably than similar efforts on behalf of other 
groups. Indeed, the driving force behind the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment was the desire to end legal discrimination 
against blacks. 
Application of the Court's standard does not throw into doubt the 
vast majority of the Nation's 435 congressional districts, where pre-
sumably the States have drawn the boundaries in accordance with 
their customary districting principles. That is so even though race 
may well have been considered in the redistricting process. But 
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mander case, has the burden of proving that "the legislature subordi-
nated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not 
limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivi-
sions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial 
considerations. "27 
The Court did not answer the question of what compelling govern-
mental interests can overcome strict scrutiny, namely, whether compli-
ance with § 2 or § 5 of the VRA is a compelling interest.28 The Court 
avoided this question again in Shaw v. Hunt ("Shaw II") ,29 the result of 
the remanded Shaw 1.30 In Shaw II, North Carolina created two spe-
cific districts to comply with § 2 and § 5 of the VRAY North Carolina 
asserted that the creation of district 12 was done in order to comply 
with § 5 of the VRA, yet the Supreme Court held that creation of such 
a district was not a remedy demanded by § 5.32 The Court affirmed 
application of the Court's standard helps achieve Shaw's basic ob-
jective of making extreme instances of gerrymandering subject to 
meaningful judicial review. 
[d. at 928-29 (O'Connor,]., concurring) (quoting the majority). 
27. [d. at 916. 
28. [d. at 921. Section 2 of the VRA provides: 
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or polit-
ical subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote 
on account of race or color .... 
A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based 
on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political 
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its 
members have less opportunity than other members of the electo-
rate to participate in the political process and to elect representa-
tives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected 
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision 
is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That noth-
ing in this section establishes a right to have members of a pro-
tected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the 
population. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) - (b) (2000). 
Section 5 of the VRA provides, in part, that the court or Attorney General 
must approve a change that would affect voting rights: 
Whenever a State or political subdivision ... shall enact to or seek 
to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different 
from that in force or effect" to ensure that "the qualification, pre-
requisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the pur-
pose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right 
to vote on account of race or color. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973c. See also infra Part II.B (discussing the VRA). 
29. 517 U.S. 899, 911 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw Ill. 
30. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
31. Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 908-14. 
32. [d. at 911-13. 
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the district court's holding that circumstantial evidence (the districts' 
shapes) and direct evidence (the legislative intent) presented at trial 
supported the conclusion that race was the predominant factor in cre-
ating the districts.33 While the Supreme Court in Shaw II ultimately 
found that the majority-minority districts were unnecessarily created,34 
the Court again announced that it would not address whether compli-
ance with the VRA is considered to be a compelling governmental 
interest when developing a redistricting or reapportionment plan.35 
The aforementioned cases, among others, demonstrate the uncer-
tainty that surrounds the redistricting process when considering the 
relationship between the Equal Protection Clause and the VRA.36 
The Supreme Court leaves open many questions making it difficult 
for lower courts to render decisions. As a result, redistricting has be-
come an area of law that demands more consistency in its application 
from both the lower courts and the United States Supreme Court. 
B. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 
The VRA of 196537 helps to ensure the Fifteenth Amendment's 
guarantee that the "rights of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."38 Yet, as 
previously discussed, the well-intentioned VRA has nonetheless 
clashed with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.39 Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA often conflict with the Equal 
Protection Clause.4o Section 2 provides that states and their subdivi-
sions may not enforce any practice that undermines minority voting 
strengthY Section 5 provides that covered jurisdictions must first 
have any changes in voting practices approved by either the Attorney 
General or the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia.42 In effect, § 5 established a regulatory scheme prohibiting cer-
tain districts from changing their voting practices. 
33. [d. at 905-06. 
34. [d. at 916-17. 
35. [d. at 911. The Court stated: "In Miller, we expressly left open the question 
whether under the proper circumstances compliance with the [VRA], on its 
own, could be a compelling interest. Here once again we do not reach that 
question .... " [d. (internal citations omitted). 
36. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 
U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 
(1995); Shaw 1,509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-l (2000). 
38. U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 1; see Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 
603, 629 A.2d 646, 660 (1993). 
39. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; supra Part I1.A. 
40. See Guinn, supra note 3, at 226 n.2; see also supra note 28. 
41. See supra note 28. 
42. [d. 
2003] The 2002 Maryland Redistricting Decision 129 
The Supreme Court interpreted minority voting strength require-
ments in White v. Regester.43 The Court held that practices that nega-
tively affect minority voting strength, when examined under the 
totality of the circumstances, will not survive challenges under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.44 In order to establish a 
violation of § 2 of the VRA, lower federal courts interpreted White to 
mean that a minority group only needed to show that the challenged 
voting practice had a discriminatory effect on its political participa-
tion.45 In 1980, however, the Supreme Court stated in Mobile v. Bolden 
that White also required a showing of discriminatory intent in order to 
prevail on a claim under § 2 of the VRA.46 
As a result of the Mobile decision, Congress rewrote § 2 of the VRA 
to reflect the pre-Mobile standard of only requiring minorities to prove 
discriminatory effect, thereby eliminating the intent requirementY 
In 1986, the Supreme Court responded to this change in Thornburg v. 
Cingles.48 The Court stated that the important question in a VRA ac-
tion is "whether 'as a result of the challenged practice or structure, 
43. 412 U.S. 755 (1973), vacated by 422 U.S. 935 (1975). 
44. See id. at 769-70; Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 603, 629 A.2d 
646,660 (1993). 
45. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 603, 629 A.2d at 660-61; see, e.g., 
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1304-06 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), 
aJfd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) 
(per curiam). 
46. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980). 
47. See Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 604, 629 A.2d at 661; Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000». 
48. 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986). The Gingles factors to identify a § 2 violation are: 
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the 
state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members 
of the minority group to register, to vote, or otheIWise to partici-
pate in the democratic process; 
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or 
political subdivision is racially polarized; 
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has 
used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, 
anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures 
that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the 
minority group; 
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members 
of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the 
state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in 
such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder 
their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by 
overt or subtle racial appeals; 
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have 
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. 
Id. at 36-37. 
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plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the politi-
cal processes and to elect candidates of their choice.' "49 
In Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,50 the Supreme Court faced the 
question of what, if any, relationship exists between § 2 and § 5 of the 
VRA.5 1 In the initial Bossier Parrish redistricting plan, there were no 
majority-minority districts.52 As such, the NAACP subsequently pro-
posed a plan that contained two majority-minority districts, thereby 
revealing that the minority group in Bossier Parrish was sufficiently 
large and geographically compact to form these districts.53 Upon re-
ceipt of this information, the Attorney General found a § 2 violation 
of the VRA and subsequently denied § 5 preclearance. 54 
The Supreme Court noted that "recognizing § 2 violations as a basis 
for denying § 5 preclearance would inevitably make compliance with 
§ 5 contingent on compliance with § 2."55 The Court rejected this 
approach, stating that § 2 and § 5 were intended to combat two, very 
different evils.56 The Court stated that § 2 applies to all states and was 
intended to prohibit dilution of minority voting strength.57 Section 5, 
on the other hand, only applies to certain states and was intended to 
prevent retrogressive changes to their existing voting procedures.58 
The Supreme Court also stated that the burden of proof differs be-
tween § 2 and § 5 claims.59 With a § 2 claim, the burden of proving 
vote dilution initially lies with the plaintiff.5O With a § 5 claim, the 
state or political subdivision has the burden of proving the absence of 
discrimination.61 Therefore, even if liability under § 2 exists, 
preclearance under § 5 should still be granted if no regression 
exists. 62 
C. Recent Treatment of Redistricting By Other States 
1. Texas 
One of the most important redistricting cases to reach the Supreme 
Court was the Texas case Bush v. Vera. 63 The United States District 
49. Id. at 44 (quoting S. REp. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.CAN. 177,206). 
50. 520 U.S. 471 (1997). 
51. Id. at 474. 
52. Id. at 474-75. 
53. See id. at 475. 
54. See id. at 475-76. See supra note 28 for the text of § 5 of the VRA. 
55. Bossier Parrish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. at 477. 
56. See id. at 476-77. 
57. Id. at 479. 
58. See id. at 477-78. 
59. See id. at 478-80. 
60. See id. at 479-80. 
61. See id. at 477-78. 
62. See id. at 486-88. 
63. 517 U.S. 952 (1996). 
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Court for the Southern District of Texas found that three districts 
were unconstitutional gerrymanders.64 The district court found that 
the three districts "were all designed with highly irregular boundaries 
that take no heed of traditional districting criteria,"65 and that the 
districts "were not narrowly tailored to fulfill the State's compelling 
interest in avoiding liability under § 2 ... of the federal [VRA]."66 
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's finding of uncon-
stitutionality in this "mixed motive"67 case.68 Upon a finding that the 
districts were created predominately because of race, the Court ap-
plied strict scrutiny, stating that compliance with § 2 of the VRA is a 
compelling governmental interest.69 The Court held that because the 
districts were not at all compact and each had highly irregular bor-
ders, they were not narrowly tailored to serve the State's interest in 
avoiding VRA liability. 70 
Professor Guinn explained that Justice O'Connor provides "the best 
guidance for states and lower courts in navigating the narrow chan-
nels and shoals of [§ 2 of the VRA] ."71 Justice O'Connor uses the 
following five factors in her analysis: (1) states may intentionally create 
majority-minority districts and take race into consideration, as long as 
they do not subordinate traditional redistricting criteria to the use of 
race for its own sake or as a proxy;72 (2) where there is racial polariza-
tion of voting, the VRA prohibits states from adopting districting plans 
that have the effect of allowing minority voters "less opportunity than 
other members of the electorate to ... elect representatives of their 
choice";73 (3) the state has a compelling interest in avoiding liability 
under the VRA; 74 (4) if a state pursues that compelling interest by 
creating a district that substantially addresses the liability it faces, and 
the district does not deviate substantially from traditional districting 
64. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd sub nom. 
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). 
65. !d. at 1345. The Texas Constitution required the legislature to use natural 
geographic boundaries, contiguity, compactness, and conformity to politi-
cal subdivisions. Id. at 1333. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
Id. at 1345. 
The Supreme Court found that while the three districts were created to 
comply with § 2 of the VRA, there was also extensive evidence that the legis-
lature was concerned with ensuring the reelection of incumbent congress-
men. Bush, 517 U.S. at 959. 
Id. at 986. 
See id. at 977. 
Id. at 979. 
See Guinn, supra note 3, at 241 (quoting The Honorable Deval Patrick, for-
mer Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Address 
at the Nat. Conference of State Legislatures (July 29, 1996), available at 
http:www.ncsl.org/statevote98/dojhtm.htm. 
Bush, 517 U.S. at 993 (O'Connor,]., concurring). 
Id. 
Id. at 994. 
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principles, the plan will be deemed to be narrowly tailored;75 and (5) 
districts that are "bizarrely shaped and non-compact" because of pre-
dominately racial reasons are unconstitutional. 76 
2. Colorado 
In the case of In re Reapportionment of the Colorado General Assembly,77 
the Supreme Court of Colorado declared the decennial redistricting 
plan unconstitutional.78 The court found that the 2002 plan did not 
comply with the criteria of article V, sections 46 and 47 of the Colo-
rado Constitution79 because (1) it was "not sufficiently attentive to 
county boundaries" and (2) it was "not accompanied by an adequate 
factual showing that less drastic alternatives could not have satisfied 
the equal population requirement."8o Because there were no federal 
violations present, the reapportionment plan proposed by the Com-
mission was struck down.81 
In its decision, the Supreme Court of Colorado provided an impor-
tant analysis of the standard of review that a court must use when re-
viewing such a decision. The court stated that its role "is a narrow 
one: to measure the present reapportionment plan against constitu-
tional standards. The choice among alternative plans, each consistent 
with constitutional requirements, is for the Commission and not the 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. 45 P.3d 1237 (Colo. 2002). 
78. Id. at 1241. Traditionally, reapportionment has been a matter of concern 
for citizens of Colorado. See id. at 1242-43. Colorado has a long history of 
citizen initiated statutes that have shaped the law in this area. Id. In 1966, 
one of the most noteworthy citizen initiated amendments to the constitu-
tion was passed, which (1) imposed a requirement of single-member dis-
tricts and (2) "allowed the General Assembly to add part of one county to 
all or part of another county in the formation of senate and house districts, 
if necessary to meet equal population requirements." Id. at 1243. In 1974, 
voters approved a citizen-initiated constitutional amendment that created 
the Reapportionment Commission to do the work of the General Assembly. 
Id. at 1244. The purpose of this initiative was to create an independent 
body to accomplish reapportionment. Id. Furthermore, Colorado is one of 
the few states in which a majority-minority district was ordered by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in order to comply 
with federal requirements. See id. at 1242-43. See also Sanchez v. Colorado, 
97 F.3d 1303, 1329 (10th Cir. 1996) (requiring the redrawing of a house 
district in order to provide the substantial Hispanic population a fair op-
portunity to elect a representative of its own choosing). 
79. Section 46 requires that the state be divided into as many districts as there 
are members of the senate and house. COLO. CaNST. art. V, § 46. Section 
47 requires that when a senatorial or representative district shall be com-
posed of more than one county, they shall be as contiguous and compact as 
possible. COLO. CaNST. art. V, § 47. 
80. In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d at 1246. 
81. Id. 
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Court."82 It is the court's job to determine whether the Commission 
followed the correct procedures and applied the federal and Colo-
rado law in their redistricting plan.83 The Supreme Court of Colo-
rado further stated: "We do not redraw the reapportionment map for 
the Commission."84 
The court recognized that federal law superimposes requirements 
on the Colorado constitutional criteria.85 In order of priority, the 
court placed the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Fifteenth Amendment first, § 2 of the VRA second, and 
the Colorado constitutional requirements last.86 In analyzing such 
plans, the Supreme Court of Colorado first looked to see if there were 
any federal law violations.87 If there are any actual or probable federal 
law violations, the court begins its analysis with that law.88 If there are 
no federal law issues, the court can then proceed to Colorado consti-
tutional criteria.89 
While neither Bush nor In re Reapportionment of Colorado General As-
sembly directly addressed all of the issues found in the 2002 Maryland 
redistricting plan, each offers valuable insight on how to analyze the 
special problems created by modern redistricting practices. One of 
the most important aspects of both decisions is the emphasis placed 
on compliance with federal requirements, specifically the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA.90 While 
state constitutional requirements do play an important role in deter-
mining the validity of reapportionment plans, state requirements are 
often superseded by federal law.91 
III. MARYLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The Maryland Constitution requires that all legislative districts 
"shall consist of adjoining territory, be compact in form, and of sub-
stantially equal population," and that "[d]ue regard shall be given to 
natural boundaries and the boundaries of political subdivisions."92 
The three main requirements stemming from this part of the Mary-
land Constitution are compactness, contiguity, and the due regard 
82. Id. at 1247 (quoting In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 
P.2d 191, 194 (Colo. 1982)). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 1247. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. (citing In reReapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185,193 
(Colo. 1992)). 
89. Id. 
90. See supra notes 66-76, 86-89 and accompanying text. 
9l. See supra notes 66-76, 86-89 and accompanying text. 
92. MD. CONST. art. III, § 4. 
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principle.93 Courts in states with similar constitutional provisions have 
held that these requirements were created, and intended, to prevent 
political gerrymandering.94 
A. The Compactness Requirement 
Geometrically, compactness is "a circle with the perimeter of a dis-
trict equidistant from its center."95 Maryland, like the majority of 
states,96 has not defined compactness in simple geometric terms.97 
Because there is no single measure of compactness, in the context of 
legislative redistricting, it is usually viewed as a relative standard.98 
The compactness requirement is generally recognized as sub-
servient to the dominant federal Constitutional requirement of the 
Equal Protection Clause.99 Some courts have held that "compliance 
with the state constitutional compactness requirement is 
mandatory."lOo Uniquely shaped districts, however, usually do not 
constitute evidence of gerrymandering. lOI Oddly shaped districts, 
therefore, do not provide definitive evidence of failure by the General 
Assembly to comply with the compactness requirement. 102 Instead, a 
court must also look to other legitimate constraints that affect redis-
tricting, such as the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and from there determine exclusively whether 
the compactness requirement was fully taken into account.103 Thus, 
the compactness requirement is considered by the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland to be a "functional" requirement. 104 
93. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 299 Md. 658,674,475 A.2d 428, 436 (1984). 
94. Id. at 675, 475 A.2d at 436. 
95. Id. at 676, 475 A.2d at 437. 
96. The possible exception is Colorado. Id. See Acker v. Love, 496 P.2d 75, 76 
(Colo. 1972) (en banc). 
97. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 299 Md. at 676, 475 A.2d at 437. 
98. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 370 Md. 312, 381, 805 A.2d 292, 333 (2002) 
(Raker, j., dissenting). 
99. See In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984), 299 Md. at 680,475 A.2d at 439. 
See also In re Interrogatories by Gen. Assembly, 497 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Colo. 
1972); Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. 1975); Davenport 
v. Apportionment Comm'n, 319 A.2d 718, 722 (NJ. 1974); Schneider v. 
Rockefeller, 293 N.E.2d 67,70 (N.Y. 1972); Commonwealth exrel. Specterv. 
Levin, 293 A.2d 15, 18 (Pa. 1972). 
100. In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984),299 Md. at 680,475 A.2d at 439 (dis-
cussing In re Legislative Dist. of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 
1972); Acker, 496 P.2d 75; Preisler, 528 S.W.2d 422). 
101. Id. at 687, 475 A.2d at 443. 
102. Id. 
103. See id. at 679, 687, 475 A.2d at 439, 443. 
104. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 370 Md. 312, 383, 805 A.2d 292, 334 (2002) 
(Raker, j., dissenting). 
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B. The Contiguity Requirement 
The contiguity requirement is also a functional consideration. 105 It 
requires "that there be no division between one part of a district's 
territory and the rest of the district."106 The contiguity requirement is 
often "affected and influenced by the population equality 
requirement." I 07 
C. The Requirement of Due Regard for Natural Boundaries 
A redistricting plan shows due regard for boundaries when it keeps 
cities, counties, and towns intact wherever possible in light of other 
political redistricting considerations. lOS The primary purpose of this 
principle is to maintain districts that enable voters to preserve an "ori-
entation" to their district. IOg The due regard principle appears to be 
the most fluid of the three requirements in Article 4 of the Maryland 
Constitution. I 10 
In her dissent in the 2002 legislative districting decision, Judge 
Raker looks to the interpretation of similar language in the due re-
gard principle of the Massachusetts Constitution by the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts. 111 The Massachusetts court held that the due 
regard principle requires districts to be formed "as nearly as may be" 
without uniting two counties, towns, or cities. 112 The court stated that 
as long as the legislature took reasonable efforts to conform to the 
requirements of the Constitution it would uphold the legislature's re-
districting plan. 113 
105. Id. 
106. In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984), 299 Md. at 675-76, 475 A.2d at 437. 
Contiguous territory is further described as "territory touching, adjoining 
and connected, as distinguished from territory separated by other terri-
tory." Id. at 676, 475 A.2d at 437. 
107. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 383, 805 A.2d at 334 
(Raker, j., dissenting). 
108. Id. at 384,805 A.2d at 335 (Raker,]., dissenting). 
109. In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984), 299 Md. at 681,475 A.2d at 439. 
110. Id. 
111. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 385, 805 A.2d at 335 
(Raker, j., dissenting). 
112. Id. (citing Mayor of Cambridge v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 765 N.E.2d 
749 (Mass. 2002». 
113. Mayor of Cambridge, 765 N.E.2d at 755. The Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts also stated: 
Id. 
Because the redistricting process involves the consideration of 
these competing factors, the clause requiring the Legislature to 
avoid the division of cities, towns, and counties "as nearly as may 
be" cannot be interpreted to require that the Legislature adopt the 
plan with the absolute minimum number of districts that cross 
county, town, or city lines. 
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D. The Three Requirements Considered Together 
The three requirements from section 4 of the Maryland Constitu-
tion were intended to work together to ensure legislative districts were 
organized as to provide fair representation.1l4 Even with this com-
mon goal, however, the three requirements often come into conflict 
with one another. 1 IS The Court of Appeals of Maryland explained 
this in its 1984 redistricting decision, stating that a "population could 
be apportioned with mathematical exactness if not for the territorial 
requirements, and compactness could be achieved more easily if sub-
stantially equal population apportionment and due regard for bound-
aries were not required."116 
In the 2002 court of appeals districting decision, the majority asserts 
that these three requirements serve as "legitimate reasons for states to 
deviate from creating districts with perfectly equal populations."1l7 
The majority points out that the Supreme Court has held that there 
are certain times when deviations from the equal population principle 
are constitutionally permissibleYs This is a narrow exception, how-
ever, that does little to advance the majority'S idea that when state and 
federal requirements conflict, the state requirements will prevail. I19 
IV. THE PROPOSED MARYLAND 2002 PLAN BY GOVERNOR 
GLENDENING AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
Maryland has only twenty-four political subdivisions-twenty-three 
counties and Baltimore City.120 In 1992, Maryland had eighteen 
shared senatorial districts. 121 Baltimore County's boundary with Balti-
more City was crossed five times, while the boundary with other coun-
ties was crossed twice. 122 Four districts consisted of more than two 
counties. I23 One district in the 1992 plan consisted of more than four 
counties.124 The redistricting plan of 1992 was an exception to the 
usual Maryland redistricting plans, which considered Baltimore City 
114. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 360-61, 805 A.2d at 320-21 
(quoting In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984),299 Md. at 681,475 A.2d at 
440). 
115. Id. at 361,805 A.2d at 321 (quoting In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984), 
299 Md. at 681, 475 A.2d at 440). 
116. In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984), 299 Md. at 681, 475 A.2d at 440. 
117. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 356,805 A.2d at 318 (citing 
Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S 533,577 (1964». 
118. Id. The Reynolds Court explained that "[a] State may legitimately desire to 
maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible, 
and provide for compact districts of contiguous territory in designing a leg-
islative apportionment scheme." Reynolds, 337 U.S. at 578. 
119. See infra notes 137-140 and accompanying text. 
120. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 620, 629 A.2d 646,669 (1993). 
121. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002),370 Md. at 364, 805 A.2d at 322. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. at 364, 805 A.2d at 323. 
124. See id. 
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and the counties as the primary elements in apportionment, and only 
crossed over subdivision lines to reach the goal of population equal-
ity.125 Despite these frequent crossovers, the legislative plan was up-
held as constitutional and was thus implemented.126 
The proposed 2002 plan had twenty-two shared senatorial districts, 
only four more than the 1992 plan. 127 In the 2002 plan, "[t]he num-
ber of districts shared by Baltimore City and County remained static, 
at five."128 The Baltimore County line was crossed nine times, as op-
posed to seven in the 1992 plan. 129 In the State's 2002 plan there 
were five districts that consisted of more than one county, an increase 
of only one since the 1992 plan. I30 Also, in the 2002 plan there were 
two districts that consisted of more than four counties, which again 
increased by one. 131 
A. The 2002 Plan Should Have Been Upheld 
In the 2002 redistricting decision, the court of appeals majority 
places a significant amount of emphasis on these aforementioned dif-
ferences,132 but the emphasis should not be placed on the number of 
times the lines are crossed. Instead, the emphasis should be on why 
the court found that the 2002, and not the 1992 plan, violated the 
Maryland Constitution because they are seemingly very similar. The 
court addressed their similarity by pointing out that in the constitu-
tionally upheld 1992 plan, the Baltimore City/Baltimore County re-
gion came close to violating the due regard provision, whereas the 
2002 plan was held unconstitutional because there were two more 
cross-overs in the Baltimore City/Baltimore County region. I33 
The 1992 court explains that there is a great danger in splitting 
districts because when there are county-line cross-overs the represent-
atives will have divided loyalty.I34 The 1992 court uses District 42, 
which splits up the "tightly knit Jewish population of Pikesville" into 
three districts, as an example.135 But the court holds that this, in it-
self, does not make the plan unconstitutional, stating that "while the 
fact that district 42 splits the Jewish community may be regrettable, 
regard for that 'community of interest' cannot overcome other consti-
125. Id. at 368, 805 A.2d at 325. 
126. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 611, 615-16, 621 A.2d 646,665, 
667 (1993). 
127. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 364, 805 A.2d at 322-23. 
128. Id. at 364, 805 A.2d at 323. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 365, 805 A.2d at 323. 
131. Id. 
132. See In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 364-65, 805 A.2d at 322-
23. 
133. See id. at 363-64,805 A.2d at 322-23 (quoting Legislative Redistricting Cases, 
331 Md. at 614, 629 A.2d at 666). 
134. Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. at 615, 629 A.2d at 666. 
135. Id. at 615, 629 A.2d at 667. 
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tutional considerations."136 One of the constitutional considerations 
noted by the court was that District 10 is a "minority district whose 
creation was mandated by the Voting Rights Act."137 The important 
reasoning behind this is the recognition of the fluidity of the due re-
gard principle and the fact that it must sometimes give way to federal 
requirements. 138 When challenged with other considerations, the 
due regard principle will often yield to those requirements.139 The 
mere fact that the numbers are slightly higher in other areas of the 
latter plan does not unquestionably prove unconstitutionality. 
In the 2002 decision, the State asserted this same argument, 
describing the Article III requirements, including the due regard 
principle, as "secondary" and stated that these requirements must 
yield to other mandates, such as the VRA.140 The majority of the 2002 
court flatly rejects this argument. 141 According to Article II of the Ma-
ryland Declaration of Rights, state constitutional requirements yield to 
federal requirements. 142 In previous Maryland redistricting decisions 
this has been interpreted to mean that, while consideration of the Ar-
ticle III requirements is mandatory, the federal requirements trump 
state law. 143 Nevertheless, the 2002 majority states that the Maryland 
Constitutional requirements are not secondary considerations.144 
This is the first example of the court's unexplained departure from 
past practice. 
The majority stated that there was an excessive number of political 
crossings in the proposed 2002 plan.145 The court relied on other 
jurisdictions to support the proposition that this rendered the plan 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 615, 629 A.2d at 666-67. 
138. See id. at 615, 629 A.2d at 667. 
139. Id. at 615, 629 A.2d at 667. 
140. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 370 Md. 312, 366, 805 A.2d 292, 324 (2002). 
141. Id. at 370, 805 A.2d at 326. 
142. MD. CONST. art. II. Article II states: 
Id. 
The Constitution of the United States, and the Laws made, or 
which shall be made, in pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, 
are, and shall be the Supreme Law of the State; and the Judges of 
this State, and all the People of this State, are, and shall be bound 
thereby; anything in the Constitution or Law of this State to the 
contrary notwithstanding. 
143. See Legislative Redistricting Cases (1993),331 Md. at 615,629 A.2d at 667 
(stating that when requirements conflict with each other the due regard 
principle "will often be the first to yield"); In re Legislative Dist. of State, 299 
Md. 658, 680, 475 A.2d 428, 439 (1984) (stating that "the compactness re-
quirement is subservient, in application, to the dominant federal constitu-
tional requirement of substantial equality of population among districts"). 
144. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 370,805 A.2d at 326. 
145. Id. at 368, 805 A.2d at 325. 
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unconstitutional. 146 In previous Maryland reapportionment cases, 
however, the court has consistently recognized that the number of 
crossings of political divisions, alone, is not evidence of unconstitu-
tionality.147 This is a second example of the court's departure from 
past Maryland redistricting procedure. 
The 2002 Glendening plan was approved and filed by the Maryland 
General Assembly.148 A plan approved in this manner carries with it a 
presumption of validity.149 The majority allocated the burden of 
proof to the state and held that the State failed to carry it.150 As Judge 
Raker points out in her dissent, however, it does not make sense to 
place the burden on the State; it should have been placed on the peti-
tioners alleging unconstitutionality. 151 She correctly identifies the ma-
jority's argument as a nonsequitur, stating that "[b]y definition, a 
presumption of validity requires that the burden of proof is upon the 
party attempting to overcome the presumption. The plaintiffs chal-
lenging the plan bear the burden of establishing that the adopted 
plan is unconstitutional."152 This is the third example of the court's 
departure from traditional practices. 
146. Id. See In re Reapportionment of the Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 
1248 (Colo. 2002) (stating that "[a] direct line of accountability between 
citizens [and their elected officials] is at the heart of responsive govern-
ment in Colorado and is built into the county-oriented design of the Con-
stitution's reapportionment provisions"); Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 
68, 88 (D. Colo. 1982) (finding that "[t]hese political subdivisions (coun-
ties and municipalities) should remain undivided whenever possible be-
cause the sense of community derived from established governmental units 
tends to foster effective representation"); Davenport v. Apportionment 
Comm'n, 304 A.2d 736, 745 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (stating that 
"[ t] he citizens of each county have a community of interest by virtue of 
their common responsibility to provide for public needs and their invest-
ment in the plants and facilities established to that end") (quotingJackman 
v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 718 (1964)); In re Reapportionment of Hartland, 
624 A.2d 323,330 (Vt. 1993) (observing that "unnecessary fragmentation of 
these [political subdivisions] limits the ability of local constituencies to or-
ganize effectively and increases voter confusion and isolation"). 
147. See Legislative Redistricting Cases (1993), 331 Md. at 615-16, 629 A.2d at 
667 (holding that the fluid due regard principle allows for reasonable 
county line cross-overs); In re Legislative Dist. of State, 299 Md. 658, 680, 
475 A.2d 428, 439 (1984) (stating that "it cannot ordinarily be determined 
by a mere visual examination of an electoral map whether the compactness 
requirement has been violated"). 
148. See In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002),370 Md. at 328, 805 A.2d at 301. 
149. Legislative Redistricting Cases (1993),331 Md. at 614,629 A.2d at 666. See 
Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325, 331 (Pa. 2002) (stating that "[a]s 
with any legislative enactment, [a redistricting plan] enjoys a presumption 
of constitutionality" and that such a plan will be declared unconstitutional 
only if it is "clearly, palpably and plainly unconstitutional"). 
150. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002),370 Md. at 368, 805 A.2d at 325. 
151. Id. at 387,805 A.2d at 337 (Raker,]., dissenting). 
152. Id. at 387-88, 805 A.2d at 337 (Raker,]., dissenting). 
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B. The Court of Appeals of Maryland Should Have Allowed the Governor 
and General Assembly to Redraw the Map 
The majority of the 2002 court makes clear from the outset that it 
"do[es] not tread unreservedly into this 'political thicket'; rather, [it 
proceeds] in the knowledge that judicial intervention ... is wholly 
unavoidable."153 But when the court declared the Glendening plan 
unconstitutional and drafted its own plan, the court delved whole-
heartedly and unjustifiably into the political arena. 
The Maryland Constitution grants the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land the power to review the constitutionality of a redistricting plan 
when it is challenged by citizens of the state. I54 The court, in accor-
dance with federal and state requirements, has the duty to decide if 
the plan is constitutional. I55 The Maryland Constitution also forbids 
the branches of government from usurping power from any other 
branch.156 The duty to redistrict is an executive and legislative func-
tion, vested in the Governor and the General Assembly.I57 Nowhere in 
the constitution is this power expressly given to the judiciary.15s 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland does have the power to review 
whether lower courts have applied the constitutional requirements.159 
The court, however, does not have the power to decide whether the 
legislature could have drawn a more constitutional plan. 160 In 
Beaubien v. Ryan, the Supreme Court of Illinois answered the question 
of who should assess what trade-offs must be made in the redistricting 
process: 
Who, then, must finally determine whether or not a district is 
as compact as it could or should have been made? Surely not 
the courts, for this would take from the legislature all discre-
tion in the matter and vest it in the courts, where it does not 
belong .... There is a vast difference between determining 
whether the principle of compactness of territory has been 
applied at all or not, and whether or not the nearest practi-
cal application to perfect compactness has been attained. 
153. In reLegislative Dist. of State (2002),370 Md. at 353,805 A.2d at 316 (quot-
ing Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D.S.C. 1992), vacated sub 
nom. Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Comm., 508 U.S. 968 (1993». 
154. MD. CaNST. art. III, § 5. 
155. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 353,805 A.2d at 316. 
156. MD. CaNST. art. VIII. 
157. MD. CaNST. art. III, § 5. 
158. Id. 
159. In re Legislative Dist. of State, 299 Md. 658, 668, 475 A.2d 428, 433 (1984). 
160. See In re Legislative Dist. of State (1984), 299 Md. at 688, 475 A.2d at 443; see 
also Acker v. Love, 496 P.2d 75, 76 (Colo. 1972) (en banc); People v. 
Thompson, 40 N.E. 307, 309-310 (Ill. 1895); In re Legislative Redistricting 
of the Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784, 790 (Iowa 1972); Preisler v. Do-
herty, 284 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. 1955) (en banc). 
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The first is a question which the courts may finally deter-
mine; the latter is [not]. 161 
141 
The majority of the 2002 court decided that its redistricting plan 
was more constitutional and adhered more closely to Maryland's con-
stitutional requirements than the plan proposed by Glendening and 
the General Assembly.162 Furthermore, the court did not give the 
Governor and General Assembly a chance to redraw the districts that 
it found unconstitutional. I63 Instead, the court developed and in-
stated its own plan, stating that there was not enough time for the 
Governor to redesign the districts.164 But the Governor and General 
Assembly were never given the opportunity to try to redesign the "un-
constitutional" districts in the limited time period; the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland had already done it for them. 165 This departure 
from past practice is not only noteworthy, it shows that the judiciary 
usurped power in what was meant to be, and usually is, an "inherently 
political"166 arena. 
The court-proposed plan contains fewer political division crossovers 
than the Glendening plan. I67 While the Maryland constitutional re-
quirements of compactness, contiguity, and due regard for bounda-
ries are adhered to very closely in the court-proposed plan, the 
adherence comes at the expense of rights granted by federal require-
ments. The major concern with the court-proposed plan is that it vio-
lates the VRA and takes away minority voting power that is protected 
under the ACt. 168 
Section 2 of the VRA is very important in the context of redistrict-
ing; it ensures that minority voters have an opportunity to elect candi-
dates of their own choosing. 169 Studies have shown that there is a 
general cohesiveness of black voting behavior and preferences and 
that these preferences differ from those of white voters. 170 It is neces-
sary to take into consideration minority populations in any redistrict-
ing plan to protect minority preferences in voting choices. The court-
proposed plan does not consider this to the extent that it is required. 
161. Beaubien v. Ryan, 762 N.E.2d 501, 507 (Ill. 2001). 
162. See In re Legislative Dist. of State, 370 Md. 312, 318-19, 805 A.2d 292, 295-96 
(2002). 
163. See id. at 323, 805 A.2d at 298. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 398-99, 805 A.2d at 343 (Raker, J., dissenting). 
166. Id. at 376, 805 A.2d at 330 (Raker, J., dissenting). 
167. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 374, 805 A.2d at 329. 
168. Id. at 389-90, 804 A.2d at 338 (Raker, J., dissenting). 
169. See id. 
170. Id. at 391 n.15, 804 A.2d at 339 n.15 (Raker, J., dissenting). See generally 
DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, 
1999 NATIONAL OPINION POLL (1999); Keith Reeves, The Consequences ofCue-
ing Subtle Appeals to Race, in VOTING HOPES OR FEARS?: WHITE VOTERS, BLACK 
CANDIDATES & RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA 9, 7&-90 (1997). 
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The VRA requires legislatures to create districts that contain a large 
concentration of minority voters. 1 71 This requirement is the only way 
to ensure that minority voting strength is not diluted. I72 The VRA 
prohibits the practice of "packing," which involves dilution of minor-
ity strength by placing a large number of minority voters in one dis-
trict as to exclude a minority majority in other districts. I73 The 
practice of "packing" poses a great threat to minority voting power 
and has been characterized as "perhaps the greatest potential for min-
imizing and diluting the voting strength of racial and ethnic minority 
voters."174 
Along with "packing" comes the problem of "bleaching," which oc-
curs when minority voting strength is weakened in districts that adjoin 
the "packed" district. I75 The "packed" district takes all the minority 
voters out of other districts and contains a substantially larger number 
of minority voters than necessary for a minority supported candidate 
to prevail. 176 Thus, the adjoining districts have significantly less mi-
nority voting power than they would have if the "packing" had not 
occurred. I77 The districts that have lost the minority strength are 
then referred to as "bleached" districts. I78 
The Supreme Court, referencing legislative history in Thornburg v. 
Gingles, outlined factors that might be probative of a violation of § 2 of 
the VRA. I79 In Growe v. Emison,I80 the Court narrowed the Gingles fac-
tors down to three. The first factor is that the minority group must be 
large enough and geographically compact enough to create a majority 
in a district. I81 The second is that the minority group must be politi-
cally cohesive. I82 The third factor, which must also be met, is that the 
white majority in the district votes sufficiently as a group to defeat the 
minority preferred candidate. I83 
The court-proposed Maryland plan violates the VRA by "packing" 
districts. Districts 40, 41, 44, and 45 in the court-proposed plan con-
tain significantly higher minority populations than those which are 
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
172. See In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 392-93, 805 A.2d at 340 
(Raker,]., dissenting). 
173. Id. at 394, 805 A.2d at 341. 
174. ]. Gerald Hebert, Redistricting in the Post-2000 Era, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 
431,439 (2000). 
175. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 394, 805 A.2d at 341 
(Raker, ]., dissenting). 
176. See id. at 394-95, 805 A.2d at 341. 
177. See id. 
178. See id. at 394, 805 A.2d at 341. 
179. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36-37 (1986). See supra note 48 (discuss-
ing the Gingles factors). 
180. 507 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1993). 
181. Id. at 40. 
182. !d. 
183. Id. 
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necessary to create a majority-minority district. 184 As a result, under 
the court-proposed plan, black voters might constitute a voting major-
ity in fewer districts than they should according to the statewide mi-
nority population and the VRA.185 
The majority in the 2002 decision plainly states that when the judici-
ary undertakes to develop a redistricting plan, "politics or political 
considerations have no role to play."186 Yet, as the majority acknowl-
edges, politics and political considerations are inseparable from [legis-
lative] redistricting and apportionment"187 and "districting inevitably 
has and is intended to have substantial political consequences."188 By 
ignoring politics entirely, it is easier to create contiguous, compact 
districts. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland should not have rejected the 
plan proposed by Governor Glendening and the General Assembly, as 
unconstitutional. The plan created districts pursuant to the VRA and 
other federally mandated requirements. l89 Although the districts 
were not as compact as the districts in the court-proposed plan,190 
they were designed in a way to consider the Maryland constitutional 
requirements and adhere to them as closely as possible. 
Redistricting is a confusing, political area in which the courts pro-
vide conflicting law. The Court of Appeals of Maryland made the pro-
cess more confusing when it redrew the district map itself. Besides 
ignoring the separation of powers principle and usurping legislative 
power, the court of appeals did not give the legislature any guidance 
for designing future redistricting plans. 191 Instead, the court pro-
vided its own ideal, non-politically considerate plan. 192 In re Legislative 
Districting of the State (2002) simply declares the plan unconstitutional 
in favor of what, in the majority view, is a more constitutional plan 
without giving the next designer of a redistricting plan in Maryland 
any guidance as to what the court expects or how to ensure that the 
minority vote in Maryland is protected, as required by the VRA. In 
short, the court imposed Maryland redistricting plan opened the door 
184. In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 394, 805 A.2d at 34l. 
185. Id. at 395, 805 A.2d at 34l. 
186. Id. at 354, 805 A.2d at 317. 
187. Id. at 354,805 A.2d at 316-17 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 
753 (1973». 
188. Id. at 354,805 A.2d at 317 (quoting Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753). 
189. See In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 327-28, 805 A.2d at 30l. 
190. See id. at 388-89,805 A.2d at 337-38 (Raker,j., dissenting) ("It is not for the 
19l. 
192. 
judiciary to determine whether a more compact district could have been 
drawn .... "). 
In re Legislative Dist. of State (2002), 370 Md. at 399, 805 A.2d at 344 
(Raker, j., dissenting). 
See id. at 354, 805 A.2d at 317. 
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to single government by allocating too much power to the courts and 
forgetting about the legislature and its vital role in designing district 
maps, a role the legislature is fully competent to handle itself. 
Brooke Erin Moore 
